基于EPR的动力电池回收演化博弈分析

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中图分类号：F201 文献标志码：A DOI： 10.13714/j.cnki.1002-3100.2025.08.013

Abstract：BasedonthefactthatthestandardizedrecoveryrateofalargenumberofusedpowerbateriesislowinChinafirstlythe interestsbetweenNGOandautomobilemanufacturersareconsideredandthedualsupervisionofNGOtoautomobilemanufacturers is consideredtouildariartiteevoutioarygemodelecondlythpaprumericallsimuatestecostoftheiitialintetioof supervisionwithNGandthedegreeofrewardadpunishmenttotheenterprsetoexplorehowtheseactorsaectthestrategicchice of the game participants.ItisfoundthatstrengtheningtheinitialregulatorywillingnesswithNGOwillelpencourageautoobile manufacturerstotaketheinitiatietoecyclediscardedpowerbateries，thatenautomobilemanufacturerstendtorecyleasively appropriatesubsidiesorincreasedpenaltiescanactivelyrecyleautomobilemanufacturers，thatthparticipationofNGOcarevese supervisethe probabiltyofparticipationthroughpublicityandthatinthestandardizedrecyclingofwaste powerbateries，thejoint supervision is better than the single supervision.

KeyWords： producer responsibility system; power battery; evolutionary game; common monitoring

0引言

动力电池的规范化回收不仅有利于促进循环经济的发展和生态文明的建设，还影响着新能源汽车是否能够实现可持续发展。（剩余8082字）