不同政府补贴策略下新能源汽车供应链定价决策

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中图分类号：F274 文献标志码：A

Pricing Decision of New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain under Different Government Subsidy Strategies

TANG Juan¹，SHEN Zi-chen1，GONG Ben-gang1 ， ZHANG Zhi-chao1 ，LIU Zhi1，² （1. Collge of Economics and Management，Anhui Polytechnic University，Wuhu 2410oo，China; 2. SHU-UTS Business School， Shanghai University， Shanghai 201899，China）

Abstract： A new energy vehicle （NEV） supply chain game decision model was constructed under three scenarios of no government subsidy，subsidy for customers who trade in their old fuel vehicles（FVs） for new energy vehicles（NEV-only subsidy），and subsidy for customers who trade in old FVs for a new FVs or NEVs （dual-subsidy），in which the government was incorporated into the supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The aim was to research the optimal government subsidy strategy and its impact on the pricing decisions and operational performance of the NEV supply chain. The research shows that government subsidy mainly affects the pricing of NEVs and the recycling price of old FVs.

The dual-subsidy policy can maximize the total sales volume of new vehicles， consumer surplus，and social welfare，while also generates the highest total fiscal expenditure. The government subsidy strategy interacts with consumers' environmental awareness and the durability of old vehicles，affecting the operational performance of the supply chain. An improvement in consumers‘ environmental awareness increases the trade-in demand of old customers. When the durability of old vehicles is low，the government's dual-subsidy policy can bring higher profits to manufacturers and retailers. However，when the durability of old FVs is high，the government's NEV-only subsidy policy is always more beneficial to manufacturersand retailers.

Keywords： new energy vehicle supply chain;government subsidy； trade-in； pricing deci-sion

汽车产业的绿色化进程是工业绿色化发展的关键一环。（剩余11862字）