政府奖惩机制下中小制造企业数字化转型演化博弈研究

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中图分类号：F49；F425 文献标识码：A doi：10.3969/j.issn.1672-2272.202503023

Evolutionary Game Study on the Digital Transformation of Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturing Enterprises under Government Incentive and Penalty Mechanism

Hou Xinyan，Jin Qiu （Schoolof Economicsand Management，Tianjin Universityof Scienceand Technology，Tianjin 30o222，China）

Abstract：The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2O25，the Government Work Report underlined the need to speed up manufacturing digital transformation.It also stressed fostering knowledgeable digital service providers and boosting support for SMEs’digital shift，guiding their digital upgrade.I explored optimal reward-punishment policies for SMEs’digital transformation in manufacturing. Considering the government’s evolving reward- punishment mechanism，Ibuilt a tripartite evolutionary game model with the government，SMEs in manufacturing，and digital transformation service providers. Through simulations，I analyzed how different policy combinations influenced the three parties‘evolutionary stable strategies.The simulation results show that static punishment - static reward and dynamic punishment- static reward policies can't make the game system reach an equilibrium. There's no stable strategy. But static punishment with dynamic reward and dynamic punishment with dynamic reward can enhance system stability，achieving a win- win for all. Among them，static punishment combined with dynamic reward works best.

Key Words：Digital Transformation；Manufacturing；Digital Service Providers；Government RewardPunishment Mechanism

0 引言

实施数字化转型对当前中国传统制造企业提高产品质量和生产效率、保持企业活力和市场竞争力至关重要[]。（剩余12567字）