创新能力不对称情景下产学研协同创新系统动态演化博弈研究

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[中图分类号]G311[文献标识码]A[文章编号]1671-8372（2025）04-0103-16

Abstract：Industry-university-institute Colaborative Innovation（IUI-CI） servesas the primarymodelchoice for implementing innovation-driven strategies，coupling knowledge production with commercialization，and promoting the domestic cycle.Usingthe evolutionary game framework，this studyconstructed a dynamic evolution model through identifying the main stakeholders involved in IUI-CI system to demonstrate the evolutionary processof this systemunder the scenarioofasymmetric innovationcapability.Theresearchresultsshow that，in theabsence ofexternal intervention， the IUI-CI system may evolve into three possible scenarios，and the initial willingnessto participation does not significantly alter theevolutionary outcomes.Theregulators’incentive measures and the beneft distributioncoffcient are criticalfactors ifluencing theevolutionprocessbuttherearesignificant differences intheirinffuenceonthestrategic choicesof industryanduniversity.Therefore，thegovernmentshouldfocus onthe benefitdistributioncoeffcientbetween the two parties and conditionally choose positive or negative incentives to enhance their participation wilingnessto engage in collaborative innovation.

Key words： industry-university-institute collaborative innovation;asymmetric innovation capability;participation willingness; evolutionary game； benefit distribution

一、引言

产学研协同创新始于1992年国家经贸委、教育部和中国科学院组织实施的“产学研联合开发工程”。（剩余18005字）