女性董事与高管薪酬契约有效性

——来自薪酬粘性的证据

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Female Directorsand Executive Compensation Contract Effectiveness： Evidence fromPay Stickiness

CAO Zhehan

（SchoolofAccounting，Shanghai Lixin Universityof AccountingandFinance，Shanghai 2Oo235，China）

Abstract：This study examines the impact offemale directors onexecutive pay stickiness using data from China's Ashare private listed companies （2OO7-2O23）froma board gender diversity perspective.The findings reveal that female directorssignificantlycurb executivepay stickiness，withnon-compensated female directorsexhibiting particularly pronounced inhibitory efects;mechanisticanalysis demonstrates that femaledirectors’governance eficacy intensifies underconditionsof high pressureandsevereagencyproblems，primarilythroughcorrectingover-optimistic expectations andmitigatingagency conflicts；furtherinvestigationestablishesthatwhile femaledirectors’governanceimpact strengthens when external governance mechanisms weaken，its efectiveness remains contingent upon robustmajor shareholder oversightsystems.These findings haveimportant implicationsforpromoting board genderdiversity， enhancing governance efficiency，and improving executive incentive mechanisms.

KeyWords：femaledirectors;board genderdiversity;executivecompensationcontracts;paystickiness; compensationsupervision governance

一、引言与文献综述

在全球治理体系日益强调多元化与包容性的背景下，董事会性别多元化已成为学术界与实务界共同关注的重要研究课题（Greene等，2020）[1]。（剩余15042字）