税收竞争与地方政府公共基础设施项自风险承担

——来自长江流域城市群PPP项目的经验证据

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中图分类号：F283；F812.42 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1007-5097（2025）07-0117-12

Tax Competition and Local Government Risk-Taking in Public Infrastructure Projects： Empirical Evidence from PPP Projects in Urban Agglomerations Along the Yangtze Rivel

DAI Chuanli'，YANG Tong²， CHEN Yunkang²，LI Xinyu （1.Decision Consulting Department，Party Schoolof Anhui Provincial Commitee of the Communist Party of China （Anhui Academy of Governance）， Hefei 23oo22， China; 2.SchoolofFinanceandPublicAdministration，Anhui UniversityofFinanceand Economics，Bengbu 233030，China; 3.School of Economics，Shanghai University，Shanghai 2OO444， China）

Abstract：This essysystematicallyassesses the impact of taxcompetition onlocal governments'risk-taking in public infrastructure projects，using PPPprojets from97cities along theYangtzeRiver between 2O15and 2022asresearch samples.The findingsreveal thattax competition significantlysuppresses local governments’risk-taking in public infrastructure projects，aconclusionthatremainsrobust afteraseriesof tests.Heterogeneityanalysis indicates hat the inhibitory efectof taxcompetition is more pronouncedinupstreamandriversideregions of theYangtzeRiver，andthat it imposesstrictercontrol onrisk-taking in economic projectscompared to social projects.Moderating efectanalysis demonstratesthatfiscal decentralization weakenstheinhibitory effectof taxcompetition，while market openness strengthensit.Theresearch provides policy implications for local governments to scientificallyalocate fiscal responsibilities in public infrastructure projects.

eywords：tax competition;public infrastructure projects; risk-taking; fiscaldecentralization;marketopenness

一、引言及文献综述

统筹好发展和安全是全面建设社会主义现代化国家必须面对的重大理论与实践问题。（剩余17964字）