基于政府、供水企业与农户三方演化博弈的高原湖泊区农业水价机制优化研究

——以云南省澄江市为例

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中图分类号：F323.213 文献标志码：A 文章编号：1004-390X（2025）05-0040-09

Abstract： To enhance the water-saving effciency in the agricultural sector of plateau lake areas and promote the optimization of water pricing mechanisms， taking Chengjiang City in Yunnan Province as an example， a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government， water supply enterprises， and farmers was constructed.The behavioral evolution paths of each subject under the influence of policy tools such as subsidies，penalties，and water price adjustments were analyzed， and the stable strategies of the system were numerically simulated using Matlab. The results showed that， the coordinated use of multiple policies was conducive to the formation of a stable equilibrium in water-saving strategies; farmers were highly sensitive to water price changes，and increasing the water price for traditional irrigation was more effective in promoting their adoption of water-saving behaviors than reducing the cost of water-saving irigation; water supply enterprises were more driven by long-term benefits，and the impact of subsidy policies was relatively limited; there was a substitution effect between government supervision and incentives，and relying solely on subsidies may lead to a lack of supervision.

Keywords： tripartite game; agricultural water resource; water price mechanism

澄江市位于云南省中部滇中高原腹地，地形以丘陵、盆地和湖泊交错分布为主，是典型的高原湖泊型农业区。（剩余11013字）