供应链上下游企业商业秘密冲突演化机理研究

打开文本图片集

中图分类号：F270 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1672-7312（2025）04-0418-11

Abstract： In order to deeply explore the conflict evolution mechanism among the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain，and reduce the occurrence of enterprise leaks，based on the evolutionary game theory，this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between external regulators and upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain， explores the strategy adjustment mechanism of the three participants from the perspective of the whole life cycle of conflict governance，and analyzes the influence of each influencing factor on the evolutionary results through numerical simulation.The results show that： In the initial and adjustment stage of conflict governance，the external regulator always strictly supervises to promote benign cooperation among enterprises，and the core enterprises graduall adjust the strategy from leakage to non-disclosure; in the stable stage，the external party reduces intervention，and the enterprises are stable in non-disclosure intention. Improve the degree of trust，non-disclosureincentive coefficient，disclosure risk coefficient，increase the intensityof punishment is an effective way to avoid enterprise infringement of business secrets.The lower management cost and more significant social effect make the external regulators more willing to continue to make effrts in the supervision.Therefore，the research provides beneficial theoretical support and deci;ion-making basis for the business secret conflict of supply chain cooperative enterprises.

Key words： supply chain collaboration; conflict of trade secrets; disclosure; knowledge sharing; evolutionary game

0 引言

随着知识经济的崛起，企业的竞争格局发生了深刻变化，传统的技术竞争逐渐演变为技术知识与资源的综合竞争。（剩余14003字）