心灵哲学视角下人工智能体犯罪之否定阐释

摘要：人工智能体作为刑法主体的可行性在法学界争议颇多，通过心灵哲学的角度，引入塞尔中文屋和查莫斯哲学僵尸概念，从人工智能体萌芽时期到近期呼声极高的ChatGPT等事务，分析梳理行为主义和图灵测试的缺陷，从而对人工智能自由意志属性做出否定判断，进而建议取消其作为刑法主体前提。

关键词：人工智能体；心灵哲学；图灵测试；哲学僵尸；自由意志

中图分类号：D924.3文献标识码：A文章编号：2095-6916（2024）05-0081-04

Negative Elaboration of Artificial Intelligence Body’s Criminal Offenses

from the Perspective of Philosophy of Mind

Huo Nannan

（Hebei University of Engineering， Handan 056001）

Abstract： The feasibility of artificial intelligence body as the subject of criminal law is controversial in the legal academy， through the perspective of philosophy of mind， introducing the concept of Selwyn Chinese house and Chalmers philosophical zombie， from the budding period of artificial intelligence body to the recent call for the ChatGPT and other affairs， analysing and sorting out the defects of behaviourism and the Turing test， so as to make a negative judgement on the attribute of free will of the artificial intelligence， and then suggesting to abolish it as the subject premise of criminal law.

Keywords： artificial intelligence body; philosophy of mind; the Turing test; philosophical zombies; free will

2006年，隨着AI教父杰弗里·辛顿提出深度学习的概念，人工智能发展进入了快车道，工业界将之转化为社会生产生活一部分的趋势日渐增强。（剩余5873字）

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