政府补贴政策对新型能源体系构建的驱动效应比较

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中图分类号：F426.2

文献标识码：A

文章编号：1672-7312（2026）04-0359-12

A Comparison of the Driving Effects of Government Subsidy Policies on the Construction of a New Energy System

SUN Linhui， SONG Junyi， SU Chang

（College of Management， Xi' an University of Science and Technology， Xi' an 710054， China）

Abstract： To compare the driving effects of two types of government subsidy policies， i. e.， ex-ante subsidies and ex-post rewards， on the construction of a new energy system， this study adopts a dynamic synergy perspective and constructs a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model involving the government， research institutes， and energy enterprises. Gaussian white noise is introduced to simulate external environmental uncertainty， while decision-making time delays are incorporated to characterize policy transmission lags. Through numerical simulation， the analysis examines the impacts of factors such as policy costs， penalty intensity， social benefits， enterprise costs and revenues， and time delays on the evolutionary paths of the three parties' strategies. The results show that the ex-post reward policy can more effectively reduce adverse selection risks and compress rent-seeking space， while accelerating multi-agent strategy convergence when policy costs are relatively low. Increases in social benefits and direct sales revenue provide positive incentives for research institutes and energy enterprises， but these need to be accompanied by differentiated penalty mechanisms to curb negative behaviors. Decision-making time delays significantly affect system stability， with longer delays prone to inducing substantial strategic fluctuations. This study aims to provide a theoretical basis for addressing policy ineffectiveness and technology transfer bottlenecks.

Key words： energy economy; government subsidy policies; stochastic evolutionary game; ex-ante subsidy; performance-based reward; time lag effect; new energy system

0 引言

全球气候治理进程的加速正在重塑各国能源战略的基本走向。（剩余16008字）